


January

1965



# POINTING VECTOR

# 24

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vol. III  
no. 2

being a joint issue of John Boardman's personal newsletter Pointing Vector and of Tom Seidman's mag Anthrohedron.

Seems we have been arguing 'politics' for a good many years now (since our undergraduate days at the University of Chicago back in '49, as a matter of fact) and it becomes clearer as time goes on that the principal divisive issue in circumstances of quite varied character has frequently been whether actions in the furtherance of social goals we both agree are desirable are themselves necessarily desirable. This joint issue is cast as a debate of that question in the context of action by government (the U.S. federal government, in particular).

Needless to say, both of us look forward to any comments, additions, etc., that anyone may pass on to us. (The relevant addresses and so on are inside -- on p. 9.) By all means send in comments to (either or) both of us.

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# 125

*Tom*  
*John*

## TOM SEIDMAN

Consider a situation in which at issue is some possible positive action by government. Let us first suppose (a) a consensus that projected purposes of the action are beneficial, (b) the foreseeable consequences are in the projected direction, (c) either no other group or institution can accomplish the desired ends (as well) or such other groups as might provide suitable alternate actions are not, in fact, doing so or likely to.

The question at issue is: Are these conditions sufficient to establish the desirability of the proposed governmental action and, if not, what additional conditions might it be necessary to impose for sufficiency? To this might be added the methodological question: How can one know that these conditions are actually satisfied?

It is my contention here that as stated above the conditions (a), (b), (c) are inadequate - the most glaring inadequacies being the application of the methodological question to condition (b) and a balancing concern with the rights of minorities in defining 'consensus' in condition (a). All too often, what consideration is given to condition (b) is based on inadequate and uncertain data in terms of theories uncertain in themselves (and frequently biased by wishful thinking).

Another caveat, related to the above but sufficiently independent to warrant special mention, is the unfortunate frequency with which actions are discussed in a far too restricted context. History is full of examples of measures introduced for good reasons whose possible effects in other directions were not considered. The most typical fallacies are that policy makers often arbitrarily assume that local actions will have only local consequences, and, of considerable importance, are concerned almost exclusively with immediate effects to the neglect of such possibly undesirable long-term consequences as might be incurred in terms, for example, of later abuse of precedents set by presently desirable actions.

Needless to say, a certain amount of this is inevitable whenever one must act in the real world. The uncertainties of action must always be balanced against the corresponding uncertainties of inaction or alternate action. However, to neglect entirely any concern with such problems is to guarantee, in the long run, making irrevocable errors.

One is reminded of the fable of the horse which permitted a man to bridle him to facilitate action against their common enemy, a wolf. When, the wolf being dead, the horse asked for his freedom, the man is said to have replied, "The hell you say - Giddap, Dobbin."

These questions are, of course, the basic considerations for any governmental action. For present purposes, however, let us restrict ourselves to consideration of these solely in the context of the (federal) government of the United States (with particular reference to such current issues as: the civil rights movement, reapportionment, a federal 'police force', aid to education, 'school prayers', the 'war on poverty', etc.) and certain state and local issues (censorship, 'sex' legislation, educational standards, welfare, etc.)

\*

ERRATUM: POINTING VECTOR #22, p. 17 - The author of High Treason, in which may be found the most complete account of the 1934 American Legion plot to overthrow President Roosevelt, was written not by Angus Cameron but by Albert E. Kahn.



## JOHN BOARDMAN

"Our land is great and abundant but there is no order in it: come to rule and reign over us."

- Message sent by the merchants of Novgorod to Prince Ryurik, 862.

In all times and places men have created or accepted governments to provide for them services they could not, as individuals, provide for themselves. To gain these ends of security for their persons and goods, they have sometimes even sustained the most cruel and arbitrary sort of tyranny. In all the chronicles of pre-democratic societies, the words "Time of the Troubles" are used to describe not despotism, but periods of anarchy and civil war.

What services does a government owe its people? As human society has evolved, the answer to this question has changed. The predatory empires of early times protected their subjects only that greater wealth might be ground out of them, and provided roads and bridges only that the ruler's commands might be more expeditiously enforced.

With the rise of popular sovereignty, whether in the old Germanic folkmoot or in the modern mass democracies, or even in the states such as the Soviet Union which employ the forms of democracy without their content, has come the idea that a people may require from their government certain basic services - not only order and physical protection, but also education, civil and criminal law, a settled economic order, and in the most advanced states a minimum standard of living. This has necessitated an increasing role of government in the lives of individuals, a role which came about in most cases from a popular demand by those individuals. The steps in this process are fairly easy to trace.

The merchants of Novgorod realized that professional fighting men, being specialists in their field, could guard their city and caravans more effectively than their own teamsters could. The twentieth-century man similarly realizes that professional teachers have the training and the time that he has not, to teach his children. He therefore accepts the idea that the government under which he lives should hire people to defend him and people to teach his children, and has a right to tax him to pay their salaries, and he does not feel that the government infringes upon his liberties in so doing.

What services, then, should a government provide? Ultimately, popular demand determines the answer to this question. In a democracy, this popular demand is relatively easy to ascertain. In despotisms, the rulers attempt to determine this demand by interpreting an inchoate public opinion, and where they guess wrong too often and too flagrantly, they are overthrown.

Some limitations, necessarily, must be placed on this "public demand". There have been times and places when one "service" the majority of the public demanded from its government has been the extirpation of a minority. To reduce internal strife among differing political or religious groups, therefore, many governments have found it desirable to include in their fundamental law inalienable guarantees to all citizens of whatever freedoms and services the public opinion of the time believes the government should provide. In practice, this aim is more easily attained when, as in the United States of America, no one such group is a majority.

In a democracy, the question of whether a proposed course of action has majority support can be answered by a referendum or, less effectively, by a legislative assembly. This method of determining whether a program should be initiated or, if already in existence, continued, makes the basic democratic assumption that the citizenry is the best judge of its own short-range and long-range interests. This is not always the case, but other systems of government have in practice proven even worse at this task.

Additional complications are provided in a government with a federal structure, where several levels of authority exist between the individual and the highest authority of the state. Here we are faced not only with the question: What services ought the government to provide for its citizens?, but: What level of government ought to provide these services?

Efficiency in the performance of these services is one criterion. The time of the United States Congress is wasted in writing fish and game laws for the District of Columbia, and a suburban city commission cannot effectively regulate a railroad passing through its jurisdiction.

At this point the discussion descends from the general to the particular. The most basic right - life itself - is most effectively protected on a lower level of government by state laws making murder a crime. But there have been cases where specific murders have not been regarded as criminal acts by state law-enforcement officials. The responsibility for investigating and punishing these crimes is then automatically shifted upwards to the federal government. To deny this is to deny that a crime has been committed, and he who makes such a denial becomes an accessory to the crime.

What if all levels of government authority refuse justice to the victims of what, by those governments' own laws, is a crime? Such an act serves notice upon the victim, his kinsmen, and others of his ethnic group or ideology, that they can look for no protection from that government. These people have not only the right, but the duty, to help bring down this government and establish another which will meet its obligations towards all its citizens.

SEIDMAN : John, I agree with what you say but ... Certainly the general acceptance and support of government demonstrate that it provides a useful way of organizing for the provision of certain social benefits (you mentioned defense, education, internal order, adjudicatory services, etc.) and equally certainly the variety of services for which people look toward government is continually increasing. This much is observation. When one comes to ask what should be the case, however, the question becomes one of morals or values. Is it, for example, proper/feasible/desirable to put the power and responsibility for so all-pervading a set of functions in the hands of the same institution?

BOARDMAN: Either there is a public demand that certain functions be placed in the hands of the government, or there is not. Certainly the government should not assume these powers in the absence of such a demand. But, if the demand exists and the government does not meet it, this is a state of affairs fraught with danger for the existence and stability of organized society. Conservative arguments to the contrary, it has never been the case in history that an initially free people has been enslaved by a progressively greater assumption of power by their government. What in fact happens is that a demo-



cratic government fails for one reason or another to meet a popular demand that it assume some power. Such a failure discredits democratic government in the public mind, and the democracy is replaced by a dictatorship which pledges to deal with the challenge which its predecessor did not meet. The Kerensky government in Russia did not bring about peace and land reform, so it was swept away. The Weimar Republic did not assure economic prosperity, so a disillusioned public replaced it with the Nazis. And the same thing came closer to happening in the United States in the early 1930's than is pleasant to reflect upon.

SEIDMAN: Perhaps that is only an argument against democratic government. Which would be an unfortunate, but not a logically impossible, inference. Every government which admits the possibility of popular demands will from time to time be faced with demands which cannot (at least immediately) be met. Sometimes one can make a facade of action and hope that things will get better in time or that this set of demands may be superceded in the public mind by demands or desires which can be met. Sometimes one cannot. Also, sometimes a demand can be met but only at the expense of letting oneself in for future trouble. The French got rid of a troublesome demand by sentencing Dreyfus to Devils Island ... The U.S. got rid of a demand for the abolition of Demon Rum by establishing Prohibition ... And so on. This, of course, is the reason we have a representative democracy rather than government by referendum -- to establish a procedural buffer between the pressures of transient popular demand and the exigencies of feasibility. This is also the reason why, despite their shortcomings, one prefers a comparatively insensitive (to popular pressures) judiciary and police force to the overly enthusiastic 'law enforcement' of vigilantes.

BOARDMAN: Well, the trouble with this is a situation such as you find in New York City today, where the police force is so insensitive to popular pressures that in parts of the city it behaves and is treated like a hostile army of occupation.

The public cannot with impunity be thwarted too long of its desires. If a sizable segment of the public is made to feel that its wishes no longer matter to the government, that government is faced with a force that has a vested interest in overthrowing it. This is the rock upon which all proposals for a limited franchise founder. As for public desires which included the sentencing of Dreyfus or the prohibition of alcohol - well, the first was accomplished in violation of Dreyfus' rights as a defendant, and the second could never have survived exposure to a popular referendum. The 18th Amendment was passed, not by referendum, but by log-rolling in the legislative bodies which you cite as "procedural buffers between the pressures of transient popular demand and the exigencies of feasibility." Domestic history from 1919 to 1933 provides as good a referendum as we ever got on the popularity of prohibition.

Those constitutional amendments and judicial decisions which are rooted in public support survive; those which are not so rooted, do not. This is why prohibition, the pro-slavery decisions of the Tarey Court, and the anti-New Deal decisions of the Hughes Court, have not survived. This is also why the income-tax and popular senatorial suffrage amendments have survived, as have the Warren Court decisions against segregation and religious exercises in public schools.

At this point I'd like to expand the scope of the discussion somewhat. The words "Star Chamber" have come to represent, in the

Anglo-Saxon nations, the whole power of an arbitrary government directed at men of unpopular political or religious views. This was, indeed, the case in the 17th century. But how had this court originated?

When Henry VII seized the English throne in 1486, the nation had been racked by 30 years of civil war between two rival branches of the Plantagenet House, the Yorkists and the Lancastrians. As frequently happens in such cases, the spoils went to a third party - the cautious, avaricious Henry Tudor, distantly connected with a bastard branch of the Lancastrians but committed to the Yorkist policy of encouraging the mercantile class against the land-owning gentry. His victory by no means stilled the civil strife. Eight members of the Royal Family had met violent deaths in this time, and there was no lack of Yorkist partisans quite willing to make Henry a ninth in this company. Large regions of England seethed with Yorkist plots.

Henry VII frequently found himself thwarted in his attempts to quell these plots and bring their perpetrators to what passed for justice in early Tudor times. Yorkist rebels were apprehended and brought to trial before local juries and judges in sympathy with their cause. Naturally, the partisans of the House of York cheerfully acquitted each other of the charges of treason, rebellion, and murder. Exasperated, and fearing a revival of the civil war which had wrought so much damage already, Henry vowed that if local courts would not convict Yorkists, he would establish in London a court which would,

Thus originated the Court of the Star Chamber. In short order it suppressed the undercurrent of rebellion in the provinces. It enabled Henry VII to pass on to his heir an England united, wealthy, and powerful. The later Tudor monarchs carried on this work, leaving a nation whose government had so little worry about revolt that, by the later parliaments of Elizabeth I, it could afford to begin expanding those individual liberties of speech and assembly. It was in these parliaments that men such as Peter Wentworth began to proclaim the human rights that we take for granted today.

At the time of its creation, the Court of the Star Chamber was an absolute necessity to a peaceful and united land. It is hardly likely that the average Englishman of, say, 1490, fearful of a revival of the Wars of the Roses, could have been persuaded that this court might become an instrument of oppression a century and a half in the future. If a man's house is on fire, he pours water on it immediately, and defers till tomorrow the question of what damage the water may have done to the foundations of the building. Tomorrow it may be necessary to repair the foundations, but today quite another problem occupies his attention.

SEIDMAN : You seem to be arguing my case. A group, out of favor with (actually in rebellion against) the central authority but with considerable local support, is suppressed by the establishment of an institution which has become the symbol of governmental oppression and, in the interest of stability, you prefer this to justice -- or do you believe that, because he was successful (so that any individual liberties which were to develop necessarily did so in the world of his heirs) his dictates necessarily were justice? Which is not to assert that the Yorkists were right or that I can think offhand of any other, better, way to have established a stable prosperity -- but I can hardly feel that you have demonstrated the Star Chamber to have been an entirely satisfactory solution to the problem.



Let's turn, then, (as you've probably been itching to do) to the Civil Rights situation. Sure, there are lots of things the federal government could do -- establishing martial law, for example, treating Mississippi as 'occupied territory' with administrating officials drawn from CORE, say, or federally organising, encouraging, and supporting an armed Negro militia or setting up an anti-segregation test (like a loyalty oath) for any employment or aid involving in any way federal funds or inter-state commerce or ... And these, as well as a lot of less extreme possibilities, are things that the federal government won't do because most of the people of these United States just aren't that hot for integration. Justice, per se, has never, after all, been really popular and when people start getting concerned for their own security ... Would you care to take a guess as to the probable results of a referendum in, say, 1951 on a proposal that everyone HUAC accused of being a 'Communist conspirator' should be strung up to the nearest lamp post? For that matter, there was the recent referendum on 'fair housing' in California.

BOARDMAN: S'pose we deal with "what is", not with "what if". My reference to the Court of the Star Chamber was to make the point that a remedy needed to deal with a situation under one set of circumstances may not apply at a later time. You've raised this question as point (b) of your original statement. If the public is left free to determine how changed conditions are to be dealt with, it is capable of abandoning institutions once necessary but now harmful. To go back to the analogy I made in my last remarks, when there's a fire you pour on as much water as you can get. After the fire is out, you then consider what damage the water may have done to the foundations of the house, and repair them if necessary.

Although the government of Henry VII was considerably less democratic than the administration of President Johnson II, a situation does exist in Mississippi and Alabama similar to that which led Henry to establish the Court of the Star Chamber. But precedents do exist in this country for the actions necessary when a state government, supported enthusiastically by a majority of its citizenry, goes into open armed revolt against the supreme authority of the federal government. The federal government has the unquestionable legal right, as stated in various supreme court decisions of the period 1865-75, to reconstruct the government of a state in rebellion. In the 19th-century reconstruction, the federal government abandoned the task too early. It'll have to stick to the job a little longer, and do it more thoroughly this time, but the job will be done.

The federal government has placed on it, by the First, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and several supreme court decisions, the obligation to step into these rebellious states and assure the legal rights of the Negro citizens. To deny this is to, in effect, deny these rights. I am not interested in abstract arguments about proper division of federal and state authority. It is sufficient to point out that, in practice, if these rights are not guaranteed by the federal government they are not guaranteed at all, and to oppose such a guarantee has the practical effect of opposing the rights themselves.

Of course, one can oppose these rights. This leads into the position, which you deplored at the top of this page, of denying human rights to a minority if the majority of the citizens of a state so wish.

SEIDMAN: Let me get myself in a little deeper -- I never did like the formulation of political action in terms of notions of 'rights'. Have you ever seen or read Anouilh's Antigone? Its high point is a discussion between Creon, the King, and Antigone contrasting the demands of practical government with the claims of absolute morality. Antigone was the heroine but I still think Creon has the right of the debate. As to Civil Rights, I would prefer the more modest formulation: a situation in which any group is treated as the American Negro makes me ashamed to be a tacit participant; I would prefer to live in a country which pays more than lip service to the principle of genuine discrimination (on the basis of individual merit alone); I wish, within the constraints of (long-term) feasibility and the counterclaims of other values, to support such actions as might be most effective in achieving this end.

Probably the attitude which irks me most in re Civil Rights (that of the segregationists doesn't irk me in the same sense just because I don't expect to agree with them) is that, since Negroes have been for so long so unjustifiably oppressed, anything which advances their welfare is justifiable regardless of the impositions it may make on others (particularly on segregationists). To return to the terminology of 'rights', the White (capitalization? why not?) inhabitants of the South -- even the most radical anti-integrationist die-hards -- have not lost their civil rights because they are wrong (ie- because I disagree with them) on this issue. I will stand with the ACLU for equity and justice (and will support priority for Negro claims) but draw the line at Negro chauvinism and at compensatory preference. A special effort at intensive training and education to 'even out initial advantages', Yes. Preferential hiring of Negroes just because they are Negroes (even if significantly less well qualified than alternate applicants) strikes me as a violation of the very principle on which I base my support for the Civil Rights movement. All of which is a little off the track of 'the justification for governmental action' but ...

ECARDMAN: Please refrain from attributing to me views which I do not possess. I do not advocate and will not argue for preferential hiring for Negroes. Nor do I accept the segregationist assumption that everything which is forbidden under segregation will be compulsory under integration. And what rights of segregationists are currently being violated? Certainly not their rights under the 2nd Amendment!

In fact, I advocate giving the widest possible audience to the statements of segregationists. Their more seditious and rebellious outbursts are good for stiffening the spines of northern moderates who don't realize the threat posed by these people, who are already in armed revolt.

SEIDMAN: I wasn't attributing those views to you -- just commenting that they irked me. As to what 'rights' are being violated, let me mention only the disputed provisions of the Civil Rights Act on public accommodations. Since I don't believe in a 'right of private property' (immune to governmental regulation) I won't say that anyone's 'rights' are being taken away but, rather, that here is an example where, toward a laudable end, the federal government has decided to interfere in the economic life of the country in an unwise, unenforceable (on the same level as Prohibition), ineffective way -- with the rather unfortunate precedent of extending to a new area (local 'small' business) governmental retaliation for heretical attitudes. Which, perhaps, gets us back to our original topic ...



BOARDMAN: I'd just as soon wait to see whether, as you claim, this new exercise of federal power does "interfere in the economic life" in "an unwise, unenforceable, ineffective way". If, long after the Civil Rights Act's aim of integration is achieved, some undesirable consequence of this act should appear in a context unforeseen today, there'll be time and opportunity enough to deal with it then.

For example, at one time it was believed that a very effective preventative of congenital veneral disease was an application of argyrol to the eyes of a new-born baby. Such treatment was made mandatory in several states. Undesirable side effects and more effective medicaments have made these laws obsolete -- and now they're in process of being repealed or ignored.

Let's deal with one day's problems at a time.

SEIDMAN: That's all very well but have you noticed how often such things do not get repealed until well after they have not only outlived their usefulness but produced a healthy crop of undesirable side effects. Such as, eg, the Court of the Star Chamber. To say, 'Let's deal with one day's problems at a time,' is an open invitation to shortsightedness. Maturity (a pre-requisite for responsible, effective government?) consists largely of the ability and the inclination to evaluate the probable consequences of one's actions. 'Necessary evils' are sometimes necessary, though evil; an attempt at foresight will sometimes show them up as unnecessary (either because they don't accomplish their end or because an alternate approach could do it better). To refuse to make such an attempt, to deal exclusively with short-term and local consequences is to relegate one's self to the role of gadfly -- useful as a goad but no guide to action.

BOARDMAN: And this is why our laws and Constitution are not as "the Law of the Medes and Persians, which changeth not". Change in laws always comes too late for some of the people and cases covered by the change -- otherwise there'd have been no reason for the change in the first place.

\*

This has been a joint publication of POINTING VECTOR and ANTHROHEDRON, whose editors apologize to the writers of letters of comment on recent issues, and solemnly promise to print said letters in the next (separate) issues of these newsletters.

ANTHROHEDRON is published irregularly but approximately quarterly. It is available for trade, contributed material, letters of comment, or, if you insist, 20¢ an issue or 4 for \$1.00, from Tom Seidman, Mathematics Dept., Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan 48202.

POINTING VECTOR is published irregularly without such a qualification. It is available for trade, contribution, letter of comment, or 25¢ an issue, 5 for \$1.00, from John Boardman, 592 16th Street, Brooklyn, New York 11218.

The speech by KKK leader Connie Lynch, which was printed in ANTHROHEDRON Vol. II, #8 and in POINTING VECTOR #22, was originally given in September 1963 near St. Augustine, Florida. The speech was reported by Rev. Irvin Cheney of Daytona Beach, Florida, who erroneously transcribed the Klansman's name as "Cornie Lee".

Long - time readers of Anthrohedron may recall a letter some while back from Gary Feinberg (Prof. Gerald Feinberg of the Columbia Physics Dept.) about the 'Prometheus Project'. The following is an expansion on that theme.

**THE PROMETHEUS PROJECT:** An inquiry into the future of the human race.

The essential unity of mankind has become an ideal of most civilized people. However, the question of what the aims of unified mankind should be has received attention mostly from religiously oriented men, whose conclusions are usually influenced by their supernaturalist world view. Secular thinkers, with few exceptions, have been concerned with more immediate questions, such as the reform of some particular aspect of society.

Although little attention has been paid to it, determination of the aims of mankind as a group has become more and more crucial as technology develops. It is a commonplace notion that human development has involved a continual increase in the interdependence of different parts of society and of the world. It is perhaps less obvious, but equally true, that in a highly interdependent world actions or decisions by a few men may produce large scale, irreversible effects which were neither expected nor desired by their initiators. The effects of fallout from nuclear tests is an example of this. In the relatively near future this possibility will grow to the point where individuals or small groups can take actions that result in a radical transformation of human existence. Consider, as an example, the construction of intelligent, self-improving computers. This development does not seem technically impossible. The most elementary considerations show that the construction of such machines would have an immense influence on human life and on the human outlook; an influence qualitatively different from any previous technological development, and certainly not easily calculable. Simple prudence would therefore suggest that their construction be preceded by an attempt to estimate the consequences. But for this acknowledge just of what the machines will do is insufficient. It is also necessary to know what purposes are to be served in making them and about other possible aims with which their existence may conflict. It is precisely this type of question which can be answered only with some knowledge of the long term goals that mankind wishes to pursue. It seems clear that if the effects of some action can strongly influence mankind as a whole, then the aims relevant to making the decision should be those of mankind as a whole, not those of some small group. The advent of 'world shaking decisions' thus calls for some kind of world-wide planning. The alternative is that man, having rescued himself through technology from being the plaything of blind nature, may become the victim of blind actions of his own.

Another place where a consensus on the goals of humanity would play an important role is in providing some meeting ground between otherwise opposing groups. The current world situation is aggravated by the theory of the diabolic nature of the opposition, introduced into contemporary history by the Communists and enthusiastically affirmed, with a reversal of roles, by the Western countries. As a result, it often appears that we are engaged in a 'zero-sum game' in which any positive achievement by one side is necessarily a loss for the other. This is surely not the case. Since all men share a common biology, as well as some elements of a common culture, there must exist aims on which we can agree with the Communists. The recognition of such aims would open the possibility of joint actions to pursue them. And possibly, through the analysis by different groups of their long term goals, may lead to a recognition of the relative unimportance of



the immediate disagreements that now seem so worth dying over. If this does not happen it is unlikely that we can avoid a series of future crises as a result of the technological advance of many countries with irreconcilable interests.

. . . . .

... I will list some of the questions which have come up in informal discussions on the 'Promethean' theme.

- 1.) Does it follow from the biological similarity of humans that we really have common aims? Can it be that there are really no 'general goals of the species' which essentially all can agree on?
- 2.) Should a statement of aims be widened to include other intelligent creatures if found (eg, dolphins, Martians, demons, IBM 137000)?
- 3.) What is the ethical decision involved in setting goals which only distant generations can fulfill? Should the present bind the future to its own purposes and, indeed, can it do so?
- 4.) Does XXth centuryman know enough about himself and the world to try to set his destiny? Should we wait for the future to set its own goals?

5.) What would the effect on human behavior be of having group goals? What proportion of the time of individuals is to be spent in working toward such goals? What of the people who dissent from a given goal?

The questions outlined above are mostly meta-ethical; ie, they are about goals in general, rather than about specific goals. I think that it is clear that such questions must be answered. But, of course, the discussion must center on specific goals or types of goals. I will therefore list a few of the possible goals I think we may want to consider. (The list is not meant to be exhaustive; the descriptive titles are only for the purpose of easy reference; no approval or disapproval is meant to be implied by the title or by the description.)

- a. Individual goal: Humanity should aim to create a world in which each individual can follow his own inclination and abilities with a minimum of outside coercion. All human activities are good, provided they are desired by at least one person and do not harm others.
- b. Faustian goal: The greatest good is the search for a yet undiscovered state of bliss. Therefore, humanity should continue this search in every way possible, such as new forms of art, science, space exploration, etc. In this search the ultimate goal is not foreseen, but partial goals may emerge along the way.
- c. Mysticism: The true frontier lies inside the mind of each individual. Thus, humanity should have only a minimum concern with the outside world, but instead should try to develop the methods by which each individual can 'know himself'. This knowledge may be incommunicable but without it one can never be satisfied.
- d. The great chain of being: Humanity is 'nature's first experiment in self-awareness'. Our work is to create the next link in the chain, ie, some consciousness better able than we to understand the world and itself -- eg, superman, supermachine, ...
- e. Humanism: Humanity, in its history, has invented a number of activities which are good; eg, science, art, love, etc. These should be cultivated in the sense that men should spend as much of their time as possible doing them, and the greatest good is to accomplish all that can be done in these human constructions.

It will be seen from the above that my ideas of goals for humanity are rather general and long range. I feel it is a major criticism of most contemporary Utopian movements that they give insufficient attention to what they really want men to accomplish. This criticism applies most seriously to the various forms of socialism. It was different with the early religious movements, which had a clearer idea about what the

world to come was like than about how to get there. We have now gone quite far in the other direction. It will be time enough to worry about how we are to get where we are going when we know where that is. Besides, XXth century man is much better at technology than at knowing what it is he wants. . . . .

-- Gary Feinberg.

\* \* \*


To my friends: My present home address is now apt.C-25, 650 Merrick, Detroit (tel.- 866-2339). Monday evenings, from about 9pm on, I am 'at home' (in the Victorian sense --meaning callers are welcome for conversation, coffee and, records, etc.). Drop in or phone. *Tom*

\* \* \*

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